Irish Gibberish!

April 25, 2011

We’ve had a number of ‘reports’ on the Irish meltdown. We’ve had the Regling Watson Report:’s%20Banking%20Crisis%2031%20May%202010.pdf

This was flagged as a preliminary report that we were led to believe would be followed up:

“The report was also commissioned in order to “identify areas for further follow-up by the planned statutory Commission of Investigation. In this and other respects, it deals with the contribution of policies, markets and specific institutions, but not the role of individuals. At all times, moreover, the disclaimer in the Preface concerning judgements about legality, as well as issues of reputation, fully applies.”

So far, reform of banking regulations has been guided by notes from Brian Lenihan:

Touted reforms have been light on detail and vague on regulation, its vagueness attenuated by a reliance on self governance through directorships, that did not work in the past.

We’ve also had the Honahan Report, “the result of intensive work undertaken during the past four months by many individuals.

The team was led by the Governor, Patrick Honohan:

Its summary conclusions were so broad in scope as to be meaningless. It gave us answers to questions we did not ask with information we already knew.

We  had and have been had by’s%20Banking%20Crisis%2031%20May%202010.pdf

No individuals were named, everyone’s job was protected.

This was touted as:

“A Preliminary Report on

The Sources of Ireland’s Banking Crisis

Klaus Regling and Max Watson”

Again, its summary findings were so broad and scope as to be rendered virtually meaningless. It gave us answers to questions we did not ask with information we already knew.

Most recently we had the Nyberg Report:

Once again it gave us answers to questions we did not ask with information we already knew.

Again, its summary findings were so broad and scope as to be rendered virtually meaningless. But because we had already figured out the answers in the report for ourselves, the report used our vindication of those findings as a cover for authenticity.

Each of the above reports were hindered by mandates that protected individuals and limited the scope to a broad brush that obscured the real truth. In each instance, personal responsibility and accountability is dissolved away into an ether of vague admonishment at the most, succumbing e.g in Nyberg to cultural stereotypes of risk averse ‘groupthink’.

If you are for  looking any daily, blow-by-blow account of the collapse of the Anglo and the Irish banking system you won’t find it above. You can see the documents regarding the collapse of Lehmans e.g

You can assume the above authors had access to documents that allowed the general conclusions involved in those reports, but you can also assume documents  in regard to the Irish banking collapse,  are a guarded secret.

I suspect that if any of the above reports saw the light of day in Finland, the USA, or anywhere other than Ireland, they would be laughed out of court.

We know nothing more of the causes of the Irish banking collapse than we did before these ‘inquiries’ began.

Insofar as we have any good information on the Irish banking collapse, the above reports amount to a load of  ‘Irish Gibberish’ designed to flatter some mistaken notion that we have inquired into our banking meltdown with professionalism and probity.

We have as yet achieved neither professionalism nor probity.

So how can we redress this unfortunate situation that plays into the hands of government and the financial system in Ireland that clearly wishes to have its business remain hidden from you, its accountability and responsibility unchallenged.

For good measure, it seeks to switch accountability and responsibility onto the shoulders of taxpayers through vindication of the infamous bank guarantee. And now through absurd ‘groupthink’ we should expect hospital porters to live on less than the minimum wage to pay for the mistakes of bankers on pensions of €3m and the losses of bondholders who gambled on dodgy Irish banks!

So what terms of reference or guidelines could an inquiry into our banking collapse follow, that would give Irish taxpayers a ‘free from coverup’, authentic, true and solid picture of the cause of our banking collapse and meltdown?

We need to extend the terms of reference of the Criminal Assets Bureau to cover financial crimes against the state:

The terms of reference should be extended to include a possible crime against the Irish taxpayer by banks and their senior management personnel:

The criminality involved above is being shored up and supported by Enda Kenny, who led us to believe all this would be investigated and the truth laid before the Irish people.”

So how should this CAB inquiry into our banking meltdown proceed?

It needs to follow the money.

To avoid Irish coverup gibberish found in the above reports, we need an inquiry along the following lines:

The CAB Inquiry into the Irish Banking Meltdown of 2008:

We would need a small team of 5 top detectives from the CAB and 5 good economists.

Strong and persuasive deterrent mandatory penalties of 5-10 yrs jail for willful witholding of evidence and giving of  false evidence.

A random sample of 5 individuals with loans of €500,000 – €1 ml should be interviewed on an agreed questionnaire list of questions,with q’s, such as, how gave them the money, what was the basis for the loan they were successful in obtaining?

Similarly, 5 individuals from each of the groups, €1-€5m, €5-€25m, €25-€50m, €50m -€150m, €150m -€250m, €250m-€500m, €500m-€1bn, including all who came within the range €500m + would also be interviewed.

Cross referencing the stories would soon bring out the change of command decisions and individuals at the heart of the Irish meltdown?

Currently, those individuals however are under NAMA protection, protected through ‘commercial sensitivity laws’ that were never designed to protect wrong doing. If NAMA was broken up, its toxic portfolio returned to the banks to liquidate, developers in NAMA under the above penalties, would only retain their current paid status with NAMA on agreement to fully cooperate with this inquiry.

If we are serious about a real investigation into our banking meltdown that does not treat us as witless fools, the CAB can be legislated for to give us the above inquiry that will quickly bear fruit.

The right tools and the right personnel will quickly yield the results required by the Irish people.

We need public access to documents, accountability and transparency,  and a decent inquiry.

Not the witless, tomfoolery of the above reports into our banking collapse?

Who’s fooling who Enda?

Prima facie evidence for the conduct of an inquiry along the above lines follows:

Here’s some prima facie evidence:

According to Enda Kenny,  there has been ” a positive response internationally ” to our position on the banks.

I presume he means the decision not to burn bondholders, which led to Moody’s reducing our ratings to one notch above junk!

In the topsy turvy world of black is white, perhaps we should reflect on the bondholders protected by Enda,(see list of bondholders in link below)eg RothsChild and Goldman Sachs. RothsChild own the IMF and Goldman Sachs (suds) provide advice to the Irish government on managing our meltdown.


See above the offshore Anglo cesspool Ansbacher Bankers route used by Haughey and we remember the scandal of offshore account tax dodging and other Ansbacher accounts. Also from above:

“Kathleen Barrington strikes again: €600m Anglo deposits that got away, 16 January 2011 By Kathleen Barrington:

“Brian Cowen should explain why Anglo Irish Bank was allowed to sell a €600 million Austrian deposit book to a Swiss bank, at a time in 2008 when he knew that Anglo Irish Bank was in dire need of deposits.”


Lenihan silent on issue of Anglo’s Austrian depositors 23 January 2011 By Kathleen Barrington:
Minister for Finance Brian Lenihan has refused to provide assurances that none of the owners of €600 million-worth of deposits held in Anglo Irish Bank’s former Austrian subsidiary owes money to the nationalised bank.

Lenihan said a bank could not disclose information about its customers, as this data was protected by client confidentiality. Anglo Irish Bank announced the sale of its Austrian subsidiary to Swiss bank Valartis on September 5, 2008.

The announcement did not disclose that the deposit book contained €600 million of deposits, a matter which was subsequently disclosed in a little noticed note in Anglo’s 2009 accounts.

It has since emerged that Anglo was pleading with Taoiseach Brian Cowen as far back as April 2008 that it was in dire need of deposits.

The bank also sought to artificially boost its balance sheet at its 2008 year end to give the impression it was retaining deposits, even though it is now known that deposits were by then haemorrhaging out of the bank.”

”Last week, Anglo declined to provide assurances that none of the owners of the deposits owed the bank money. The bank cited client confidentiality. ”

We had the helicoptering out of deposits under the shadow of Anglo’s imminent collapse.

Note all the above revelations are internet based and not the subject of open, transparent public inquiry. Though we hope and assume they are the subject of Garda Inquiry.



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